Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-00367-F (O)
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
____________________________________________________________________________
JEFF BARON,
Appellant,
v.
CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE DANIEL J. SHERMAN
Appellee
____________________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
For the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division
Bankruptcy Petition No. 09-34784-sgj11
____________________________________________________________________________
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT
____________________________________________________________________________
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Gary N. Schepps
Gary N. Schepps
Texas State Bar No. 00791608
Drawer 670804
Dallas, Texas 75367
(972) 200-0000 - Telephone
(214) 347-4031 - Facsimile
Email: legal@schepps.net
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons and
entities have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order
that the judge of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
1. Parties
a. Appellee: Chapter 11 Trustee Daniel J. Sherman
b. Appellant: Jeff Baron
2. Attorneys for Parties
a. Appellee: Munsch, Hardt, Kopf & Harr, P.C.
3800 Lincoln Plaza
500 N Akard St
Dallas, Tx 75201
b. Appellant: Gary N. Schepps
Drawer 670804
Dallas, Texas 75367
3. Other interested counsel & parties:
Daniel J. Sherman
representing Daniel J. Sherman (Trustee)(Appellee)
Sherman & Yaquinto
509 N. Montclair Ave.
Dallas, TX 75208-5498
Jay Ong
representing Daniel J. Sherman Trustee
Munsch Hardt Kopf & Lee Jacob Pannier Harr, P.C.
3800 Lincoln Plaza
500 N Akard St
Dallas, Tx 75201
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Raymond J. Urbanik
representing Daniel J. Sherman;
Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr,
500 N. Akard St., Ste. 3800
Dallas, TX 75201-6659
Charla Aldous
representing Aldous Law Firm
Aldous Law Firm
2305 Cedar Springs, Suite 200
Dallas, TX 75201
Mark Edward Andrews
representing Grupo Andrea, S.A. de C.V.
Cox Smith Matthews Incorporated
1201 Elm Street, Suite 3300
Dallas, TX 75270
Stanley D. Broome
Formerly representing Jeffrey Baron
The Broome Law Firm, PLLC
105 Decker Court
Suite 850
Irving, TX 75062
Gerrit M. Pronske
representing Pronske & Patel, PC
2200 Ross Avenue
Suite 5350
Dallas, TX 75201
Craig Alan Capua
formally representing Iguana Consulting, LLC,
Novo Point, LLC, Quantec, LLC
West & Associates, LLP
320 South R.L. Thornton Fwy.,
Ste. 300
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Dallas, TX 75203
Jeanne Crandall
representing Reyna Hinds & Crandall
Reyna, Hinds & Crandall
1201 Elm Street, Suite 3850
Dallas, TX 75270
Angela B. Degeyter
representing VeriSign, Inc.
Vinson & Elkins, LLP
2001 Ross Ave., Ste. 3700
Dallas, TX 75201-2975
James Michael Eckels
7505 John Carpenter Freeway
Dallas, TX 75247
William Lloyd Foreman
representing Owens, Clary & Aiken, LLP
Owens, Clary & Aiken, L.L.P.
700 N. Pearl St., No. 1600
Dallas, TX 75201
Michael A. Grow
representing Grupo Andrea, S.A. de C.V.
Arent Fox LLP
1050 Connecticut Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Michael S. Haynes
representing Peter S. Vogel
Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer & Feld LLP
1700 Pacific Avenue
Suite 4100
Dallas, TX 75201
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Melissa S. Hayward
representing Manila Industries, Inc. ;
Netsphere, Inc.; Franklin Skierski Lovall Hayward LLP
10501 N. Central Expy, Ste. 106
Dallas, TX 75231
Edwin Paul Keiffer
Formally representing Ondova Limited Company;
Wright Ginsberg Wright Ginsberg Brusilow P.C.
Republic Center, Suite 4150
325 North St. Paul Street
Dallas, TX 75201
Bradley Clay Knapp
representing Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP
Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell
2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2200
Dallas, TX 75201
Ryan Kenneth Lurich representing Friedman & Feiger, L.L.P.
Friedman & Feiger, L.L.P.
5301 Spring Valley Rd. Ste 200
Dallas, TX 75254
Gary G. Lyon
representing Gary G. Lyon
Gary G. Lyon, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1227
Anna, TX 75409-1227
Dennis Oliver Olson
representing Novo Point, LLC
Olson, Nicoud & Gueck, LLP
1201 Main Street, Suite 2470
Dallas, TX 75202
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Franklin H. Perry
representing Payne and Blanchard, LLP; HCB, LLC;
700 N. Pearl St.
Ste 500, North Tower
Dallas, TX 75201-7424
Patrick W. Powers
representing Powers Taylor LLP
Cash Powers Taylor, LLP
Powers Taylor LLP
8150 N. Central Expressway, Suite 1575
Dallas, TX 75206
Jeffrey H. Rasansky
representing Rasansky Law Firm
Rasansky Law Firm
2525 McKinnon, Suite 725
Dallas, TX 75201
David D. Ritter
representing Grupo Andrea, S.A. de C.V.
Kane, Russell, Coleman & Logan
3700 Thanksgiving Tower
1601 Elm St.
Dallas, TX 75201-7207
Alec P. Rosenberg
representing Grupo Andrea, S.A. de C.V.
Arent Fox LLP
1050 Connecticut Ave N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
202-857-6395
Deirdre B. Ruckman
representing Peter S. Vogel
Gardere,Wynne & Sewell
1601 Elm St., Suite 3000
Dallas, TX 75201
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Eric Lopez Schnabel
representing VeriSign, Inc.
Dorsey & Witney (Delaware) LLP
300 Delaware Ave., Ste 1010
Wilmington, DE 19801
Eric J. Taube
representing Asia Trust Limited, as Trustee of The, Village Mark C. Taylor
100 Congress Ave., 18th Floor
Austin, TX 78701
Martin Keith Thomas
representing Jeffrey Baron
Thomas & Sobol
P.O. Box 36528
Dallas, TX 75235
CERTIFIED BY: /s/ Gary N. Schepps
Gary N. Schepps
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS............................................................i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...............................................................................................vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................................................ix
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..............................................................................xi
ISSUES PRESENTED .....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................1
ARGUMENT SUMMARY .............................................................................................2
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................2
ISSUE 1. IS THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AUTHORIZED AND EMPOWERED
TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF SERVERS.COM THROUGH A 11
U.S.C. §363 MOTION, AND CAN A BANKRUPTCY COURT AUTHORIZE THE
SALE OF PROPERTY NOT OWNED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE UNDER
§363(B) ?...................................................................................................................................2
A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review......................................................................2
B) Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(2)............................................................2
C) Conclusion......................................................................................................................3
ISSUE 2. WERE ALL OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT’S FACT FINDINGS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS ? ....................................................................................................4
A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review......................................................................4
B) Uncontroverted Evidence...............................................................................................4
C) As a Matter of Law, Jeff Baron and not the Ondova bankruptcy estate owns half
of the domain name “Servers.com”......................................................................................4
i. The Emke Settlement........................................................................................................ 4
ISSUE 3. DID THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE MOTION
TO SELL THE DOMAIN NAME SERVERS.COM, INCLUDING ERRING IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW JEFF BARON’S COUNSEL TO ARGUE AND PRESENT
EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF ? .............................................................................................6
A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review......................................................................6
B) Failure of Due Process...................................................................................................6
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ISSUE 4. DOES THE BANKRUPTCY COURT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION, OR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENTER AN ORDER
AUTHORIZING THE SALE OF PROPERTY NOT OWNED BY THE
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE ?.....................................................................................................7
A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review......................................................................7
B) Unconstitutional Delegation of Judicial Authority ........................................................7
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................7
PRAYER...........................................................................................................................8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.......................................................................................8
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Bass v. Hoagland,
172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1949) ....................................................................................................... 6
Due Process. E.g., Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)..................................................................................................................... 6
Forgay v. Conrad,
47 U.S. 201, 204 (1848)...................................................................................................................... xi
Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970)..................................................................................................................... 6
Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975)..................................................................................................................... 6
In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc.,
2008 WL 2951974 *6 (Bankr.D.Del. 2008)........................................................................................ 3
Lawler v. Guild, Hagen & Clark, Ltd. (In re Lawler),
106 B.R. 943, 952 (N.D.Tex. 1989) .................................................................................................... 2
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 429-430 (1982) ............................................................................................................. 6
Matter of Greene County Hosp.,
835 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1988) ...................................................................................................... xi
Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.,
17 F.3d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1994) ......................................................................................................... 2
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 71-72 (1982) ................................................................................................................... 7
Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A.,
762 F.2d 1303, 1308 (5th Cir.1985) ............................................................................................ 4, 6, 7
Section 363. E.g., In re Hearthside Baking Co., Inc.,
397 BR 899, 902 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 2008) ........................................................................................... 3
Southmark Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand,
163 F.3d 925, 929 (5th Cir.1999) ............................................................................................ 2, 4, 6, 7
Southmark Corp. v. Marley,
62 F.3d 104, 106 (5th Cir.1995) .......................................................................................................... 2
Stern v. Marshall,
131 S.Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011)................................................................................................................ 7
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FEDERAL STATUTES
11 U.S.C. §101......................................................................................................................................... 4
11 U.S.C. §363(b).................................................................................................................................... 2
28 U.S.C. §158........................................................................................................................................ xi
FEDERAL RULES
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a) ................................................................................................................................... 3
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
28 U.S.C. §158 vests jurisdiction in this Court to hear this appeal from an order of the
bankruptcy court, ordering the sale of property and possessing a definitive operative finality.
See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 204 (1848); Matter of Greene County Hosp., 835 F.2d 589,
593 (5th Cir. 1988).
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ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE 1. Is the Bankruptcy Court authorized and empowered to determine the
ownership of Servers.com through a 11 U.S.C. §363 motion, and can a Bankruptcy
Court authorize the sale of property not owned by the bankruptcy estate under
§363(b) ?
ISSUE 2. Were all of the Bankruptcy Court’s fact findings clearly erroneous ?
ISSUE 3. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in granting the motion to sell the domain
name servers.com, including erring in refusing to allow Jeff Baron’s counsel to argue
and present evidence on his behalf ?
ISSUE 4. Does the Bankruptcy Court have Subject Matter Jurisdiction, or
Constitutional Authority to enter an order Authorizing the Sale of property not owned
by the bankruptcy estate ?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order granting authority to sell property that was not owned by
the bankruptcy estate and for which no adversary proceeding was held to determine ownership. R.
8-10.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Ondova Bankruptcy Court Judge entered an order placing Servers, Inc. into
receivership because Servers, Inc. was in default of its obligations regarding the domain
name Servers.com. R. 255. Accordingly, because of Servers, Inc.’s default, as a matter of
Texas and Nevada state law, pursuant to the agreement between the parties the domain name
servers.com reverted to Baron and Emke and they became 50/50 owners of the domain
name. The Ondova bankruptcy estate retains its 50% ownership interest in Servers, Inc.,
however, as a matter of Texas and Nevada state law, Servers, Inc. no longer owners
“servers.com”.
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ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The Bankruptcy Court is not authorized nor empowered to determine the ownership
of property through a 11 U.S.C. §363 motion, and a Bankruptcy Court cannot authorize the
sale of property not owned by the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. §363(b). Moreover,
allowing the bankruptcy judge such power would violate the US Constitution.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
ISSUE 1. Is the Bankruptcy Court authorized and empowered to determine the ownership
of Servers.com through a 11 U.S.C. §363 motion, and can a Bankruptcy Court authorize the
sale of property not owned by the bankruptcy estate under §363(b) ?
A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
De novo review extends to all legal issues, application of law to fact, and mixed
questions of fact and law. E.g., Southmark Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 163 F.3d 925, 929
(5th Cir.1999); Southmark Corp. v. Marley, 62 F.3d 104, 106 (5th Cir.1995). The bankruptcy
court’s legal conclusions are always subject to de novo review. Nichols v. Petroleum
Helicopters, Inc., 17 F.3d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1994) De novo review requires the Court “to
make a judgment independent of the bankruptcy court’s without deference to that court’s
analysis and conclusions.” Lawler v. Guild, Hagen & Clark, Ltd. (In re Lawler), 106 B.R.
943, 952 (N.D.Tex. 1989) (Fish, J.).
B) Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(2)
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(2) provides that a proceeding to
determine the Estate’s “interest in property” be an “adversary proceeding
” and “governed by
the rules of this Part VII.” Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7001. By contrast, a Section 363 motion to sell an
asset of the Estate is merely a “contested matter” governed by Rule 9014. Fed.R.Bankr.P.
9014. Accordingly, a bankruptcy court is not empowered or authorized to determine
ownership of an asset in deciding a motion under Section 363. E.g., In re Hearthside Baking
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Co., Inc., 397 BR 899, 902 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 2008); In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., 2008
WL 2951974 *6 (Bankr.D.Del. 2008), holding:
“The Court cannot determine whether the [property is] property of
the estate through a contested matter, such as a sale motion under
Section 363. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(2) requires
that an adversary proceeding be commenced to determine the
‘validity, priority or extent of [an] interest in property.’”
C) Conclusion
Thus, the Bankruptcy Court erred and exceeded its authority in ordering the sale of
Servers.com without first establishing the Bankruptcy Estate’s interest, if any, in the asset in
an adversary proceeding pursuant to Rule 7001(2). Id. Notably, the public policy served by
this rule is substantial– before businesses outside of bankruptcy proceedings can be stripped
of their assets, the bankruptcy court must conduct a full adversarial proceeding including
service of process on the interested parties and the full disclosures required by Fed.R.Civ.P.
26(a). See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9014(c) (mandatory disclosure requirements of ‘adversary
proceedings’ do not apply in ‘contested matters’). Accordingly, because a mandatory
element required for authorization pursuant to Section 363(b) is that the property be owned
by the bankruptcy estate, the Bankruptcy Court’s order to sell an asset not owned by the
bankruptcy estate was not an authorization under the grant of authority provided by Section
363(b).
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ISSUE 2. Were all of the Bankruptcy Court’s fact findings clearly erroneous ?
A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. See Bankr.R.P. 8013; Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303,
1308 (5th Cir.1985). De novo review extends to all legal issues, application of law to fact,
and mixed questions of fact and law. E.g., Southmark Corp, 163 F.3d at 929.
B) Uncontroverted Evidence
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 363(p), the entity asserting an interest in
property has the burden of proof on the issue of the extent of such interest. Bankr.R.P.
363(p); 11 U.S.C. §101 (15) (“entity” includes the estate). However, the uncontroverted
evidence established Jeff Baron and not the bankruptcy estate of Ondova owned a half
interest in the domain name “servers.com”.
C) As a Matter of Law
, Jeff Baron and not the Ondova bankruptcy estate owns half
of the domain name “Servers.com”
i. The Emke Settlement
The Emke settlement transferred most of the rights to “servers.com” to a new entity
(Servers, Inc., a Nevada corporation). R. 246-9. The new corporation’s stock was owned
50/50 by Ondova and Emke. Id. No one disputes Ondova’s right to ownership of the Servers,
Inc. stock. However, the Emke settlement expressly reserved an interest in the domain name
for Emke and Baron personally. Id. Pursuant to the agreement, Baron and Emke reserved
a security and reverter interest in the domain name, reverting ownership on the condition
that the corporation was ever placed into receivership. Id. Specifically the Emke settlement
agreement provides:
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“In the event of insolvency, receivership and/or other default of the jointly
owned company, the domain name <servers.com> shall revert to Jeff Baron
and Mike Emke, to be owned jointly and equally. To this degree, these two
principals shall maintain a first lien and security interest in the domain name
superior to any other investor, equity holder or creditor.”
R. 247.
On October 18, 2011, the Ondova Bankruptcy Court Judge entered an order placing
Servers, Inc. into receivership because Servers, Inc. was in default of its obligations
regarding the domain name Servers.com. R. 255. Accordingly, because of Servers, Inc.’s
default, as a matter of Texas and Nevada state law, pursuant to the agreement between the
parties, the domain name servers.com reverted to Baron and Emke and they became 50/50
owners of the domain name. The Ondova bankruptcy estate retains its 50% ownership
interest in Servers, Inc., however, as a matter of Texas and Nevada state law, Servers, Inc.
no longer owns “servers.com”
To be clear, the reversion interest was triggered not
because Ondova or Servers, Inc.,
went into bankruptcy. Servers, Inc. was not placed into bankruptcy. The event triggering the
reversion interest was the default of the jointly owned company
(Servers, Inc.) in carrying
out its purpose as agreed in the original Emke settlement and being forced into receivership.
Notably, it is Servers, Inc. that lost ownership of servers.com, not
Ondova. Similarly,
Servers, Inc.’s loss of servers.com had nothing to do with the fact that Ondova happened to
file for bankruptcy. The Ondova estate owned stock in Servers, Inc. and it did not lose that
stock. Just as if Ondova had owned stock in Microsoft, Inc. and Microsoft defaulted on
some contract and lost rights thereby, Ondova’s stock in Microsoft, Inc., would be decreased
in value accordingly. Nothing in the bankruptcy law prevents Microsoft, Inc., from losing
assets pursuant to pre-existing legal rights and agreements because Ondova owned Microsoft
stock and then went bankrupt. Similarly, nothing in the bankruptcy law creates any special
rights relating to Servers, Inc., because Ondova happened to own Servers, Inc. stock and
Ondova went into bankruptcy. The statutory protections afforded to an entity in bankruptcy
do not extend to corporations the bankrupt entity happens to own stock in.
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ISSUE 3. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in granting the motion to sell the domain name
servers.com, including erring in refusing to allow Jeff Baron’s counsel to argue and present
evidence on his behalf ?
A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. See Bankr.R.P. 8013; Richmond Leasing, 762 F.2d at 1308. De novo review
extends to all legal issues, application of law to fact, and mixed questions of fact and law.
E.g., Southmark Corp, 163 F.3d at 929.
B) Failure of Due Process
The Bankruptcy Court refused to allow Jeff Baron to be heard on the sale motion.
ASR. 98. That refusal is a fundamental failure of Due Process. E.g., Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)(A fundamental requirement of due process is "the opportunity to
be heard); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975)
(same); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-430 (1982). Accordingly, the
Bankruptcy Court’s order should be found to be void. Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209
(5th Cir. 1949) (“We believe that a judgment, whether in a civil or criminal case, reached
without due process of law is without jurisdiction and void”). The Bankruptcy Court appears
to have erroneously found that the District Court could strip Baron of his Constitutional right
to Due Process by its receivership order. Notably, the purported receiver did not claim any
ownership interest in the domain name servers.com.
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ISSUE 4. Does the Bankruptcy Court have Subject Matter Jurisdiction, or Constitutional
Authority to enter an order Authorizing the Sale of property not owned by the bankruptcy
estate ?
A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. See Bankr.R.P. 8013; Richmond Leasing, 762 F.2d at 1308. De novo review
extends to all legal issues, application of law to fact, and mixed questions of fact and law.
E.g., Southmark Corp, 163 F.3d at 929.
B) Unconstitutional Delegation of Judicial Authority
Authorizing a bankruptcy judge to finally adjudicate and transfer ownership interest
in non-estate property, the statute would be an unconstitutional delegation of federal judicial
authority to non-Article III judges. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71-72 (1982); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011). Allowing a
bankruptcy judge to finally adjudicate state law ownership rights would unconstitutionally
grant such judges unbridled and unchecked judicial authority over the property of the entire
community. See Id. The constitutional violation is illustrated by the example of an individual
who retires and purchases a multi-family dwelling with their life savings. By mistake or
through the deception of an unscrupulous debtor, while our retiree sleeps one night, the
bankruptcy court might sell that property to an investor for a fraction of the property’s value.
In the morning, without notice, our retiree would find themselves homeless and penniless—
without any hearing before an Article III judge and without any order issuing from an Article
III court.
CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Court’s order should be reversed.
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PRAYER
Appellants pray that the Court reverse the bankruptcy court’s Order. In the alternative,
Appellants pray that this appeal be considered as an application for writ of mandamus to order the
Bankruptcy Court to vacate its order, which exceeded the Bankruptcy Court’s statutory grant of
authority. In the alternative Appellants pray for remand to determine ownership of the asset, and
to compensate Appellants for their ownership interest.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Gary N. Schepps
Gary N. Schepps
Texas State Bar No. 00791608
Drawer 670804
Dallas, Texas 75367
(972) 200-0000 - Telephone
(214) 347-4031 - Facsimile
Email: legal@schepps.net
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that this brief was served this day on all parties who receive notification through
the Court’s electronic filing system.
CERTIFIED BY: /s/ Gary N. Schepps
Gary N. Schepps
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
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