Motion to strike intervention GARY LYON AND MARK TAYLOR

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CAUSE NO. 10-11915 
 
 
 
 
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE INTERVENTION   
 
COMES NOW Jeffrey Baron (“Baron
"
)
,
 and files Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Pleas in 
Intervention of Lyon and Taylor  and would respectfully show the Court as follows: 
1.  On July 3, 2014, Gary Lyon (“Lyon”) filed a Plea in Intervention 
2.  On  May  8,  2014,  Powers  Taylor,  LLP  (“Taylor”)  filed  a  Plea  in  Intervention  
(Collectively, Lyon, Taylor are hereinafter referred to as the “Interveners”) 
3.  Gary Lyon is a client of Defendants Gerrit Pronske and PGK. Mr Lyon, not licensed by 
the state Bar of Texas, entered into a written contract with Mr. Baron to provide legal services in 
the state of Texas. In 2010, Mr. Lyon released all claims against Baron and executed an accord 
and satisfaction with Mr. Baron. Despite this agreement and release, Mr. Lyon made a fraudulent 
claim in the receivership action along with Defendants Pronske and PGK, falsely claiming $____ 
against Mr. Baron. After being rebuffed by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in December 2012, 
Mr.  Lyon  took  his  same  fraudulent  claim  to  the  bankruptcy  court,  filing  an  involuntary 
bankruptcy petition against Baron. The petition was dismissed for lack of standing.  
JEFF BARON, 
 
                        Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
GERRIT M. PRONSKE, INDIVIDUALLY 
AND PRONSKE & PATEL, P.C. 
 
                        Defendants. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT,
 
 
 
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
 
 
 
193
rd
 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FILED
DALLAS COUNTY
8/28/2014 10:45:48 PM
GARY FITZSIMMONS
DISTRICT CLERK

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4.  Taylor and Powers is a client of Defendants Gerrit Pronske and PGP. Taylor and Powers 
represented Baron  in a  civil action.   Taylor and  Powers have a  written engagement agreement 
with Baron and have been paid in full in accordance with the agreement. Taylor and Powers sent 
Baron confirmation that they considered Baron to have fully complied with the agreement.  After 
being solicited  by Lyon  and Pronske,  Taylor made  a groundless  claim in the  bankruptcy court 
and  in  the  receivership  action  suddenly  alleging  an  additional  $_____  in  fees.      After  being 
rebuffed by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in December 2012, Taylor took his same groundless 
claim  to  the  bankruptcy  court,  filing  an  involuntary  bankruptcy  petition  against  Baron.  The 
petition, like his claim in the receivership was dismissed for lack of standing.  
5.  A suit is currently pending in the bankruptcy court against Mr. Lyon, Mr. Taylor and Mr. 
Pronske  for  attorney  fees  and  damages  resulting  from  their  bad  faith  filing  of  the  involuntary 
bankruptcy against Baron. Defendants Pronske and PGK represent Mr. Lyon and Mr. Taylor in 
the bankruptcy court suit. 
6.  As much as Defendants Pronske and PGK desire them to participate and complicate this 
proceeding,  the  Intervenors  do  not  have  standing  to  intervene.  An  intervening  party  must 
demonstrate a “justicable interest” in the pending suit. In re Union Carbine  Corp., 273 S.W.3d 
152, 155 (Tex. 2008); Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982); Zeifman v.  Michels, 
229 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied).  The Intervenors have not and cannot 
do so. 

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7.  The  Texas  Supreme  Court  explained  the  "justiciable  interest"  requirement:  “Because 
intervention is allowed as a matter of right
1,
 the “justiciable interest” requirement is of paramount 
importance:  it  defines   the  category  of  non-parties  who  may,  without  consultation  with  or 
permission from the original parties or  the court, interject their interests into a pending suit to 
which  the  intervenors  have  not  been  invited”     Union Carbide at  154-55  (internal  citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
8.  In  Union Carbide,  the  Texas  Supreme  Court  had  an  opportunity  to  examine  an 
intervention  similar  to  that  of  the  Interveners  in  this  case.    In  rejecting  such  intervention,  the 
Court  explained  that  disruptive  interlopers  are  not  entitled  to  intervene  in  a  cause,  keenly 
observing that “[t]he intervenor’s interest must be such that if the original action had  never been 
commenced,  and  he  had  first  brought  it  as  the  sole  plaintiff,  he  would  have  been  entitled 
to  recover in his own name to the extent at least of a part of the relief sought” in the original 
suit.  Id  quoting  King v.  Olds,  12  S.W.  65,  65  (Tex.  1888).  “In  other  words,  a  party  may 
intervene if the intervenor could have  “brought the [pending]