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PRONSKE GOOLSBY & KATHMAN, P.C.
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Gerrit M. Pronske
214-658-6501
gpronske@pgkpc.com
September 3, 2014
Honorable Carl Ginsberg
193rd District Court
Dallas County
600 Commerce Street
Dallas, TX 75248
Re: Jeff Baron v. Gerrit M. Pronske, Individually, et al; Case No. DC-10-11915
Dear Judge Ginsberg:
I am in receipt of the Objection to Proposed Final Summary Judgment submitted
yesterday by counsel for Jeff Baron, Leonard Simon. His Objection is incorrect, and this letter is
in response.
Mr. Simon raises essentially 2 objections to the Proposed form of Final Summary
Judgment that I submitted to the Court yesterday. Mr. Simon cites the Court to no law and no
cases that support his incorrect positions.
First, Mr. Simon argues that the proposed Judgment provides for prejudgment
interest “when the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment made such request.” I believe he
meant to say “did not make such a request.” The Defendant’s First Amended Answer and
Counterclaim filed in this case on May 16, 2014, specifically requested, in the prayer for relief,
“pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all monetary relief sought herein at the highest
rates allowed by law.” In the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on July 25, 2014,
we requested, in the prayer for relief, "any such other and further relief, whether based in law or
equity, that Defendants may be lawfully entitled.” Under Texas law, the Texas Supreme Court
holds that statutory or contractual interest may be predicated on a prayer for general
relief. Benavidez v. Isles Constr. Co., 726 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. 1987); see also Olympia Marble
& Granite v. Mayes, 17 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). In the
present case, our request in the Counterclaim was specific, and the request in the Motion for
Summary Judgment was general. This is more than sufficient under Texas law for an entitlement
to prejudgment interest.
Second, Mr. Simon argues that the "proposed order impermissibly allows for
prejudgment interest at the State Rate of Interest,” instead of the federal rate for the time that the
case was pending in the federal court. Again, Mr. Simon cites no law and, again, he is incorrect.
It is ironic that Mr. Simon claims that he should be entitled to the rate of interest in the federal
court that he caused to remand this case to the state court. However, the law provides that what
court the case is in is irrelevant. Even if this case had remained in the federal court, the Texas