Sherman, and to pay expenses such as for legal research.
2. Sherman’s motion is lengthy, but lacks any statement of the legal grounds
for the relief requested by the movant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1)(B); Intera Corp. v.
Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir. 2005). Jeff Baron accordingly moves to
strike the motion, and jointly and in the alternative to require a more definite
statement so that a more specific response can be made.
3. Notably, the district court has been divested of jurisdiction over the
receivership, and lacks jurisdiction to award attorneys fees with respect to work on
the matter on appeal. As a matter of established law, when Jeff appealed the
receivership order the District Court was divested of jurisdiction as to matters
relating to the receivership orders and subsequent orders and, for that reason, fees
cannot be recovered in the district court for work relating to those orders. Taylor v.
Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 1981).
4. In our country, absent statutory authority the "American Rule" applies
with respect to attorney's fees. Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) ("a
general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory
authority."); KeyTronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 815 (1994) (attorney's
fees are not a recoverable cost of litigation "absent explicit congressional
authorization.").
5. No provision of the bankruptcy code, authorized the Trustee to seek a
receivership in order to reduce the amount of ‘claims’ that might be made in the
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