No. 10-11202In theUnited States Court of Appealsfor the Fifth Circuit▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬NETSPHERE, INC. Et Al,Plaintiffsv.JEFFREY BARON,Defendant-Appellantv.ONDOVA LIMITED COMPANY,Defendant-Appellee▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Appeal of Order Appointing Receiver in Settled Lawsuit▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Cons. w/ No. 11-10113NETSPHERE INC., Et Al, Plaintiffsv.JEFFREY BARON, Et Al, Defendantsv.QUANTEC L.L.C.; NOVO POINT L.L.C.,Appellantsv.PETER S. VOGEL,Appellee▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Appeal of Order Adding Non-Parties Novo Point, LLCand Quantec, LLC as Receivership Parties▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬From the United States District CourtNorthern District of Texas, Dallas DivisionCivil Action No. 3-09CV0988-F▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬AMENDED RESPONSE TO VOGEL EX PARTE MOTIONTO PREVENT FINANCING OPTIONS▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬-1-TO THE HONORABLE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS:COMES NOW Appellants, and subject to the preliminary Fifth Amendmentobjection and motion previously filed in this cause, and subject to the responsesand motion previously filed with respect to Vogel’s motion to sell the assets ofNovo Point, LLC and Quantec, LLC, Appellants make this response to Vogel’s “exparte motion” 7/01/2011 SEALED MOTION for reconsideration of orderregarding financing Options.1I. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITYVogel’s Motion is Clearly Not of an “Indifferent” Receiver as Required by LawAs a matter of well-established law, a receiver is an officer of the courtwhich appoints him and must be “an indifferent person between parties”. E.g.,Booth v. Clark, 58 US 322, 331 (1855); Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 154F.2d 978, 991 (2d Cir.1946) (“A receiver ... owes a duty of strict impartiality, or`undivided loyalty,' to all persons interested in the receivership estate, and must not`dilute' that loyalty.”). From the perspective of an indifferent receiver, it should notmatter whether a party obtains a loan in order to have a receivership stayed ordissolved. In simple language, it is none of the receiver’s business. Yet, Vogel hasinvested an extraordinary amount of effort to prevent the dissolution or stay of theinstant receivership.1This responses replaces Document 00511598195 filed on 9/9/2011.-2-Vogel’s Arguments Are Not CredibleVogel makes the absurd argument that secret, private sales2will generatehigher sales prices than a public auction. Vogel, however, can offer no explanationas to why a purchaser who is willing to pay a set price in a private sale would notpay that same price in a public auction. At a minimum, assets for which there is aprivate bidder can be placed on auction with a reserve price equal to the privatesale price. Public auction is not some crazy idea thought up by Appellants’ counsel.Rather, public auction is the Congressionally mandated and long accepted meansof selling property by court decree. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2004, the requirementsof 28 U.S.C. §2001 (including the requirement of sale though public auction),apply to personalty.3Vogel makes the similarly absurd argument that the Appellants would seekto minimize the return of the liquidation of receivership assets in order to ‘prevent’“claimants” from being paid. Vogel’s argument makes no sense. Since the assetsof Novo Point, LLC, and Quantec, LLC, if sold at reasonable value, have beenvalued based on the receiver’s own reports at around $80 Million, it would makeno sense to liquidate all of those assets to pay $600,000.00 in contested claims.Similarly, it makes no sense to liquidate $30 Million in unique domain assets for 32Vogel has not disclosed his relationship to the proposed purchasers, or the relationship betweenhis law firm and its clients to the proposed secret purchasers.3Notably, Vogel’s “professional”, Mr. Nelson, set up a procedure to sell domains throughauctions that included specific marketing and advertising of the domains before holding theauction. Vogel has had months to engage in such marketing, but has refused, insisting that theassets should be sold to his personally selected buyers in secret, private sales.-3-cents on the dollar to ‘friendly’ purchasers, as Appellants strongly suspect Vogeldesires to do. Notably, although the District Court ORDERED Vogel to do so, herefused to disclose the names of the domains he desires to sell, the amounts, or theidentity of the purchasers. (See page 1 of Vogel’s motion). Vogel clearly does notwant this information uncovered, nor does Vogel want to allow the Appellants tosecure alternative purchasers, nor to allow the Appellants avoid liquidation of theassets by posting bond. Vogel raises all sorts of accusations against Appellants’counsel, and makes all sorts of unsupported claims and allegations. Still Vogelcannot explain why the Appellants would prefer the liquidation of $80 Million inassets to pay $600,000.00 in alleged claims. More naturally, Appellants seek tomaximize the income received from the sale of any asset. If assets are to beliquidated, a single asset worth $1 Million should be sold for $1 Million, instead of30 assets worth $30 Million being sold for $1 Million to insiders in private, secretsales.WHEREFORE, Vogel’s motion should be in all things denied and overruled.Respectfully submitted,/s/ Gary N. ScheppsGary N. ScheppsTexas State Bar No. 007916085400 LBJ Freeway, Suite 1200Dallas, Texas 75240(214) 210-5940 - Telephone(214) 347-4031 - FacsimileEmail: legal@schepps.netCOUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS-4-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEThis is to certify that this motion was served this day on all parties who receivenotification through the Court’s electronic filing system.CERTIFIED BY: /s/ Gary N. ScheppsGary N. ScheppsCOUNSEL FOR APPELLANT